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responsibility for the inland distribution of petroleum in a theater of operation. It also discusses the impact of not having any petroleum brigades in the active force structure to meet theater receipt, storage and distribution during the early stages of combat operations. It brings to light the importance of having petroleum expertise resident in the active force to continue developing future technical expertise in planners and managers at the sustainment brigade, the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) levels.
Balancing Petroleum Force Structure/Capabilities between Active and Reserve Components
Throughout the struggle, it was in his logistic inability to maintain his armies in the field that the enemy's fatal weakness lay. Courage his forces had in full measure, but courage was not enough. Reinforcements failed to arrive, weapons, ammunition and food alike ran short, and the dearth of fuel caused their powers of tactical mobility to dwindle to the vanishing point. In the last stages of the campaign they could do little more than wait for the Allied advance to sweep over them.
-Dwight D. Eisenhower Component Command and Defense Logistics Agency Energy levels. These dynamics pose a risk to the Army's ability to meet its Title X requirements.
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These Title X requirements are codified in the most current version of Department of Defense (DoD) directive 4140.25M that communicates policy pertaining to energy commodities and related services, and assigns the Army with the requirement to provide bulk petroleum and water support for all U.S. land forces to include Air Force, Marine and Naval units ashore. In accordance with this directive, the Army is singularly responsible for ensuring effective and responsive petroleum (POL) support by funding, maintaining and employing tactical storage and distribution systems to supplement fixed facilities, and to maintain laboratories required for certifying the testing and evaluation of petroleum related products used for ground vehicle and equipment system applications and other than fixed wing aircraft. Most importantly, the directive mandates the Army to provide the necessary force structure and capabilities to install and operate tactical petroleum storage and distribution systems to include pipelines during peacetime and wartime missions that facilitate the successful and efficient deployment and employment of forces.
The Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) enables the Army to meet the vast majority of requirements associated with its Title X responsibilities. The system was initially developed in the early 1980s following a comprehensive study conducted by the U.S. Army Quartermaster School that revealed there was no effective means of providing bulk petroleum support for land forces in austere and undeveloped theaters of operations. Since its inception, IDPS has proven effective in enabling U.S. land forces to achieve and maintain tactical, operational and strategic advantage through rapid and decisive movement and maneuver.
engineering oversight in the IPDS during the early phases of operations. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services' force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed. Unlike some other classes of supply, fuel shortages cannot be worked around without significantly changing the operational plan. Besides the greater emphasis that fuel received in planning and preparation in comparison to other classes of supply, other factors unique to fuel supply and distribution were important as well. During combat and other operational missions, the TSC employs the ESC as a forward deployed headquarters to provide command and control for theater opening, distribution, and petroleum units within and between specified areas of operations. 12 Within the ESC, the fuel and water branch is responsible for the detailed Joint
Operations Area (JOA) petroleum plan, and directs the employment of petroleum forces to meet theater plans and fuel requirements and objectives. In executing these functions, the ESC works closely with the SAPO and DLA to plan for, receive, and distribute bulk petroleum in theater. While the ESC functions at the operational level, it may be required to manage petroleum operations at the tactical "receipt and distribution" level until a Sustainment Brigade establishes operations in a theater.
Forces and capabilities that enable the TSC to perform these functions reside primarily in the Reserve Component. 
Key Facts and Assumptions
In further framing the strategic dilemma facing the Army with respect to petroleum force structure and capability, numerous DOTMLPF related facts and assumptions add greater clarity to the context of this research effort. These facts and assumptions highlight the challenges associated with current petroleum force structure, capabilities and doctrine and warrant change.
To begin with, petroleum doctrine is outdated because it references organizational structure and units that no longer exist. Specifically, Field Manual (FM)
10-67, Petroleum Supply in Theaters of Operations, (October 1985) references Army of
Excellence (AOE) Petroleum force structure. 15 The decisions associated with the recent FDU make this manual obsolete. Similarly, Theater Sustainment Command, FM 4-94, (February 2010) is outdated because it assigns petroleum planning responsibilities to the petroleum group in support of the TSC and ESC. 16 With the planned deactivation of the three petroleum groups within the Reserve Component, and only one petroleum group in the Active Component, the Army's ability to execute the concepts outlined in FM 4-94 is suspect. Both of these doctrinal manuals require update and alignment with existing force structure decisions.
The decision to migrate the majority of petroleum capability to the Reserve Stop website contains current terminology and training tasks for theater sustainment command and expeditionary sustainment command petroleum planning and execution, it still contains references to Petroleum Groups. 24 Arguably, the most important shortfall associated with petroleum specific training and education is that currently, petroleum support companies do not train to install IPDS pipeline, but are heavily relied on to execute pipeline missions within existing operational constructs.
In addition to these facts, several planning assumptions provide further notice to the importance of modifying DOTMLPF constructs as they apply to increased emphasis and reliance on Reserve Component capability to support operational petroleum requirements. Doctrinally, current Major Combat Operation plans will validate the early entry need for IPDS but will require approximately half the number of pipeline distance/assets used in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Early entry priorities for horizontal engineers in the sustainment Brigade, expeditionary sustainment command, and theater 14 sustainment command will consist of port clearance, road improvement, and base camp infrastructure, not IPDS construction. Furthermore, petroleum Group and battalion level engineers develop petroleum-specific skills in site survey, topographic analysis, pipeline and hose line trace, pipeline and terminal construction, and fixed tank storage facilities (construction and maintenance). Therefore, the requirement to provide IPDS will rely heavily on Army Reserve PPTO, petroleum headquarters units and liaison teams.
These assets will not be available for early deployment, and will require 64 days or more to arrive in theater. (Statutory 30 days call up before involuntary mobilization plus 34 days post mobilization training and validation.)
With regard to training, education and manning, the loss of Active Component petroleum battalions and the petroleum group will degrade the "technical" qualifications and petroleum planning skills of NCOs, warrants, and officers. Additionally, the DLA, ASCC, JPO, and SAPO will require senior petroleum qualified officers (O5-O6) and NCOs (E8) to fill critical positions supporting strategic petroleum functions. Similarly, host and partner nations will require assistance from skilled senior level (O6) personnel to coordinate terminal ops, inland distribution, and ground storage (beyond DLA activity at receipt in theater) (a liaison mission done by SAPO). This dynamic highlights the need for improvement in senior level training and educational programs.
Finally, HRC ASI Management is unlikely to improve without a business rule change, and HRC will continue filling positions with personnel that do not possess relevant ASI or petroleum backgrounds at operational and strategic levels in the expeditionary sustainment command, theater sustainment command, and ASCC. As a force provider, ASCC petroleum Branch personnel manage peacetime and in-transit fuel requirements with DLA and do not provide operational planning support for combatant commanders.
Essential Requirements and Recommendations
The Army must have adequate petroleum force structure and capabilities in place and available to deploy during the early phases of operations and establish the initial theater petroleum receipt, storage, and distribution system while Reserve Component forces to sustain the response effort. In order to meet operational demands within the current force structure construct, mobilization times must be expedited. 
Conclusion
The Army must move forward with a sense of urgency and demonstrate resolve to rectify organizational shortfalls pertaining to petroleum force structure. Given recent strategic level decisions pertaining to petroleum capabilities, the recommendations provided in this research effort will allow the Army to meet its Title X responsibilities.
Based on this research effort and on previous organizational capabilities assessments it is imperative to codify the notion of an "Operational Reserve" to meet early entry demands. This will become even more important as the Army begins to align forces to meet emerging requirements associated with Regionally Aligned Forces. This research paper also emphasizes the importance of having the right force structure in place in order to provide experiential learning and training opportunities for NCOs and officers within the petroleum area of expertise.
The good news for the Army is that it understands the problem and has begun to move forward in the right direction to mitigate gaps between the active and Reserve
Components. Having the correct force structure is just one piece of the solutionequally as important is making sure Soldiers are trained and ready to perform their technical duties. The end state is to provide the capability required to support the Joint War Fighter and the nation's Allies when called on.
